Historically, the Colombian executive wielded considerable control over the policymaking process, even when the president lacked legislative support. Before the adoption of the Constitution of 1991, this was possible chiefly due to extensive decree powers which allowed the president to routinely bypass a legislative process that was mostly composed of locally-oriented legislation initiated by deputies. The 1991 reforms curtailed unilateral executive power, making the president much more reliant on legislative support. However, throughout the 1990s the party system became even less accommodating to the executive as parties increasingly fragmented and a pattern of extreme individualism continued (Shugart, Moreno, and Fajardo 2007). Without unilateral avenues or strong congressional party support, the president faced constant legislative resistance. The perceived failures of the political system ignited a debate on the need for an electoral reform aimed at encouraging a stronger party system, which finally passed in 2003 and significantly reduced party fragmentation in the House and Senate (Pachón and Shugart, 2010).
individualized and with weak programmatic foundations. These factors operate in conjunction with legislative rules that greatly empower individual members of Congress. As a result, coalitional presidentialism in Colombia has yet to serve as an effective means to coordinate between legislative parties and the executive branch.
In this chapter, we analyze the current Colombian legislative process in terms of the input and output of the legislative agenda during the four presidential periods from 1998-2014. Our sample includes all bills introduced in Congress during this period, with a subset of "major" bills coded as those mentioned in the media -specifically those appearing on the front page of the largest national newspaper (El Tiempo) . During this time, the electoral and party system has changed significantly, while presidential constitutional power and the internal rules of congress have remained unchanged. Importantly, changes in Colombia's party system have coincided with the formation of multiparty coalition cabinets designed to facilitate executive-legislative relations instead of ad-hoc legislative coalitions. Such presidential coalitions have been associated with executive-legislative coordination in the policy-making process, especially in Brazil (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000, Amorim Neto 2002 ). Colombia's recent party system changes have indeed produced coalition building between legislative parties and the president. However, we show that the growth in such coalitions does not lead to any additional advantages for these presidents because interparty coalitions do not translate into a means to organize the legislative process.
First, legislators face incentives to focus on developing personal constituencies rather than supporting their party's collective agenda. Second, unlike in Brazil, decentralized formal institutional rules in Congress empower deputies to influence both the agenda and the content of bills, which affects the legislative efficiency of the governing coalition. As a result, legislative bills continue to predominate in legislative output, deputies from parties in the coalition have no advantages over others in passing legislation, and executive failures remain just as frequent despite large and increasingly formalized coalitions.
The first section of this chapter discusses the institutional features that allocate rights over the legislative agenda, focusing on the powers of the president and the features of the chamber that empower individual deputies. The second section focuses on the characteristics of the party system and coalition patterns, focusing on the recent changes brought about by the 2003 electoral reform. The third part examines the empirical record with regard to the introduction and passage of legislation. We find that the dramatic changes in the party system, though bringing coalitions designed for more cooperative executive-legislative relations, have not produced substantial changes in president's or coalition parties' ability to efficiently control the legislative agenda relative to the ad hoc bargaining that preceded it. Following Alemán and Tsebelis in the introduction of this volume, the absence of cohesive majority governments in Colombia requires that we focus on the details of agenda setting institutions and the incentives of legislative actors to better understand policy outcomes.
THE INSTITUTIONS OF AGENDA CONTROL IN CONGRESS
The Mesa Directiva in each chamber presides over the bill scheduling and is in charge of leading the debate according to the House and Senate rules. The Mesa is composed of a President and two vice-presidents, each with one-year terms and without the possibility of reelection. Despite the short terms for the members of the Mesa, and the practice of formal votes to replace these positions after each year, the parties in Congress reach a negotiated agreement on which members will hold these positions across the entire presidential term before the first legislative session begins. On the floor, the Mesa president also is in charge of ensuring that bills are actually voted on, as widespread absenteeism means that active mobilization is needed to form a quorum and the Mesa president has the power to sanction members. Such mobilization is also necessary to protect executive bills from amendments.
While controlling the legislative leadership in each chamber is important, it by no means enables party negotiations among the coalition to control the agenda. First, unlike other countries with presidential coalitions, such as Chile or Brazil, no formal institutions exist in Colombia's Congress to empower or even recognize party leaders. Only since 2010, under Santos, has even an informal effort emerged to integrate Mesa and party leadership and better coordinate among governing parties. This produced the Mesa de Unidad Nacional, an informal body in which the President and his ministers discuss and decide the legislative agenda with the presidents of all parties in the coalition (Prieto 2011). This arrangement was intended to facilitate integration between the formal leaders of parties, the executive coalition and the agenda-setting process.
By far the most important institutions governing the legislative process in practice are legislative committees. All bills are required to go through the committee stage and neither the Mesa nor the floor can discharge bills, thus it is imperative for the executive coalition to attempt to influence at least the most important committees. Members of the seven permanent committees in the Senate and in the House of Representatives are chosen through negotiation among parties and can serve the entire term. Historically, legislators with the most clout and prominence tend to get their preferred committee assignment and to become chairs (Pachón 2003) . Each committee's president (chair) is formally elected by the committee but these too are assigned in practice by informal negotiation for one-year non-renewable terms. Committee presidents decide on the agenda of each committee and choose the ponentes (rapporteurs) for the bills assigned to the committee.
1 Being a ponente gives a legislator the advantage to propose changes to the bill even before the debate is opened to the members of the committee. The informal practice is that the proposal made by the ponente is voted on in the committee, not the original text proposed by the author.
Primarily as a result of these considerable powers, legislators in Colombia can delay and influence all bills that go through the legislative process. Negotiations among party leaders in the coalition and the president are no guarantee these hurdles can be overcome. Formally, the president has several powers to influence the agenda. First, the president holds the right of exclusive introductory powers in certain policy areas. Second, the president has the means to expedite the consideration of bills. Third, the president has urgency powers, such that Congress is required to begin committee deliberations and decide on priority bills within 30 days. The president can also freeze the agenda until a decision is taken, reducing the ability to delay consideration. 3 In addition, the president can also call for joint sessions for the House and Senate committees, which reduces the time of deliberations and limits amendments and dilatory strategies. 4 Finally, the president can use extraordinary sessions during the legislative recess for Congress to debate the executive's priority bills. 5 Together these powers have the potential to ensure priority for executive initiatives, but by no means allow the president to bypass efforts by members of Congress to impede executive bills.
Once executive bills are on the agenda, the president must still work to restrict amendments from altering legislation, as the bills are fully open to committee or floor amendments throughout the process. Open amendment rights can be used by any members and often are employed by members to claim credit for a modification of an executive bill. Further, the executive branch cannot itself propose amendments except through members of their coalition in Congress. 6 Conference committees provide a venue for presidents to counteract deputy interference in the content of legislation but, depending on their makeup, this process can just as easily work against executive interests (Alemán and Pachón 2008) . For these reasons, even with a majority coalition, the president cannot easily control all aspects of the legislative process for executive bills, much less legislative initiatives.
Meanwhile, the president lacks unilateral power to resort to decrees except under temporary emergency situations, the constitutionality of which is determined by the Constitutional Court. 7 Although the Court may allow decree power to be exercised before review, even for months, states of emergency do not provide an alternative to statutes. As such they have been used infrequently.
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In sum, the institutional and political circumstances within the Congress make it extremely difficult for the president to control the policy-making process without consistent cooperation from a coalition in Congress. Overall, consistent with the expectations of Alemán and Tsebelis in the introductory chapter, formal agenda setting powers are insufficient for presidents to overcome the challenges stemming from heterogeneous legislative coalitions in combination with decentralized chamber rules.
THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN THE COLOMBIAN LEGISLATURE
The Colombian political party system has changed significantly since the 1991 Extreme party system fragmentation was persistently criticized by the public, nongovernmental organizations and members of the political elite. In 2003, the electoral system was reformed to an open list system 10 from one that functioned as a multimember plurality system with candidates effectively independent from one another. 11 This reform naturally had a significant impact on the aggregation of the political party system, as parties had to limit their lists to only one per district, as well as reach a 2% threshold to win representation in 2010 , and 3% in 2014 (Pachón and Shugart, 2010 
Presidential Coalitions
Given the power that legislators have to shape the agenda, especially in terms of blocking and delaying legislation, the president has a strong incentive to form stable relationships with a coalition of deputies in Congress. During the period under study, presidents attempted to form a variety of coalitions using cabinet appointments and negotiating with legislative parties. These have grown in their size, depth and formality across the four presidential periods under study. As were heavily influenced by Uribe's public popularity. Uribe's effort to seek a constitutional amendment allowing him a third term shook the unity of the coalition, however, resulting in the loss of Cambio Radical's support. Nonetheless, Uribe's popularity remained as strong as in the beginning of his term, with a 71% mean approval rate and his popularity maintained these levels or improved throughout his second term.
Despite the existence of congressional coalitions in both Pastrana and Uribe administrations, the nomination of the cabinet remained a largely separate process from congressional organization. Most cabinet members during this time could be considered "independents" or technocrats despite their formal association with a political party since they had at most a very loose connection to their parties in Congress. President Santos, historically a
Liberal and former Defense Minister of President Uribe, ran as the candidate from the Partido de la U in 2010. After his victory, 14 Santos was able to obtain support from the Conservative (PCC),
Liberal and Cambio Radical parties to build a grand coalition -Unidad Nacional (Hoskin and Pachón 2011). This cabinet coalition is known to have involved policy negotiations in exchange for legislative support. Notably, to obtain the support of the Liberals, Santos made a major concession on compensation for victims from the civil conflict, a prominent Liberal proposal that had been opposed by Uribe. The Conservatives preserved influence over rural policies, such as subsidies to coffee producers. A program for housing for the poor was given priority due to the inclusion of Cambio Radical, who obtained the Housing ministry. Given the size of the coalition seat share, the negotiations within the coalition held the potential to substantially reduce legislative bottlenecks for the government agenda. Santos also began with strong public support --in his first two years he had an average approval rating of 69 percent. However, Santos lost much of his support after 2012, with his approval falling to 43%, when he pursued a constitutional reform to streamline the justice system that resulted in an embarrassing failure.
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The small leftist PDA, in opposition through all the Uribe period, remained the most visible ideological opponent of the president. Other small but influential parties, such as the Partido MIRA and the Green Party, also obtained representation in the House and Senate with only a handful of seats.
The programmatic nature of parties and patterns of roll call voting
Below we illustrate some of the recent patterns in the party system by examining the distribution of preferences across the parties as well as their aggregate voting patterns. In contrast to the survey data just presented, roll call voting reflects the end result of the party influence on members as well as the indirect influence of legislative organization on the agenda and therefore the set of choices available to legislators. Thus, the apparent differences between roll-call-based measures and survey based measures can be taken as an indication of these organizational effects in the House. In figure 5 . The emergence of some bipolarity in the chamber was short-lived, however. As described above, Santos formed an even broader coalition than Uribe. This coalition nominally incorporated all major parties, unifying the parties associated with Uribe's governments with the largest opposition party in the previous term, the Liberals. The unipolar distribution of voting patterns by party from this term captures the dynamic of a centrist coalition formed around the president. As cabinet partners, Liberals are no longer distinguished from the government, reflecting both their coalition membership and policy movement by the government to incorporate Liberal positions. Meanwhile, the political right is best represented by the most conservative members of the PCC. 22 The only party functioning as a consistent opposition in voting patterns is the small leftist Polo Democrático. Further, Santos' coalition coincides with an internal consolidation of the most ideologically diverse governing parties, De la U and Cambio Radical, each of which had contained groups of members opposed to the government during Uribe's second term.
Taken together, it is apparent that the parties in Congress have developed programmatic distinctions although floor voting is chiefly a function of government membership and does not illuminate interparty differences. In the next section, we show that even these dramatic changes have not led to aggregate changes in patterns of law-making.
PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
We now examine how the institutional setting interacts with the political actors involved in the policy-making process in Colombia. We focus on the four most recent legislative periods -1998-2014 -and distinguish local, national and major bills from others in terms of legislative introduction, success and productivity.
Who introduces legislation?
At the introduction stage, a large number of bills come from the legislature. Executive introduction has, overall, been stable at roughly 10-12% of all bills in the period considered in this chapter. Figure 5 .3 displays the total number of bills introduced by each branch and chamber during the period in question, divided by two-year periods under each president. The general patterns among branches are stable across time, both in the proportions each branch introduces, as well as total bills during the period. One of the biggest exceptions to this stability takes place in the most recent period, during the last two years of Santos' term. This period of inactivity coincides with the large-scale failure with the Justice Reform mentioned above and the subsequent crisis that it generated within Congress (Escandón 2013).
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In terms of patterns across parties, these vary little across time when taking into account party sizes, but it is noteworthy that two small non-government parties -MIRA and PDA -account for a substantial amount (293 and 227 respectively since 2002) of total bills introduced despite very small seat shares. Each of these parties is associated with efforts to take positions using legislative introduction.
Figure 5.3: Bills Introduced by Branch and Chamber 1998-2014
Source: Author's calculation. Data from Congreso Visible. An important source of variation in the Colombian Congress is whether bills deal with national or local policy, which we would expect to vary with changes in the party system and coalition patterns. To examine this, we follow criteria similar to Taylor-Robinson and Díaz (1999) to classify bills as "local" and "national." A bill intended to target a municipality, a hospital within a certain region, or some economic sector in a particular region is considered "local." Bills with no specific targets modifying a code, or creating a social benefit for a broader group of citizens who fulfill certain criteria are considered "national" bills.
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For the most part, whether national or local, the bulk of bills can be interpreted as the independent activities of individual deputies. While the vast majority of bills introduced deal with some aspect of national policy, about 13% of deputy bills are local in nature.
Who passes bills?
So far we have discussed simply legislative activity, without regard to viability. Here we show how many of the bills introduced actually make it to the floor and have a chance of approval. Figure 5 .4 shows the fate of bills by presidential period separated by branch of origin.
There are four categories shown: first, those bills that could not make it out of an initial committee stage; second, those that that passed one chamber and failed in committee in the second chamber; and, third, bills that die in the plenary floor in either chamber; finally, all bills that made it through the legislative process.
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The vast majority of legislative bills -over 70% on average -fail to pass the committee stage, although this has declined slightly over time. For the executive, this number is much lower at 21% (excluding treaties), the notable outlier being the second part of Uribe II discussed below.
While the on average 66% of the executive bills pass, this figure is only 17% for legislators. We next examine more closely how presidents and legislators have varied in their ability to ensure the passage of bills and how the type of legislative bills corresponds to their success.
First, looking again at presidential success, figure 5.5 shows the predicted success rates from probit estimates of enactment as a function of type and administration (see First, a clear pattern is present that local bills have a much higher passage rate than national bills. One reason for this is that local bills do not provoke the policy conflicts associated with national policy, thus there are fewer political barriers to passage. Second, coalition status of the author does not greatly affect probabilities of success for bills, although there is some difference present among local bills under Santos. Across terms, the probability of success for national bills changes little. The main source of variation comes from changes in the success of local bills across time, where legislators of all types had much greater success rates on local bills during Uribe I.
To examine how these successes translate into the overall output of the legislature, we 
Introduction and Enactment of Major Bills
While we have separated local from national bills above, only a few "national" bills are broad in their scope and political salience. Figure 5 .8 shows patterns of introduction and enactment of "major" bills, defined here as those mentioned in the media -specifically those appearing in the front page of the largest national newspaper (El Tiempo). By this definition, the executive has introduced 10-15 major bills per year, despite very different coalitions and political contexts. From the executive side, aside from several treaties, these bills typically include major campaign promises, routine but important bills such as the budget, and bills that respond to major events. Legislators' major bills are almost as frequent. The major bills from legislators mainly reflect efforts to respond to current events or concerns of the public, especially About 70% of executive major bills are enacted, consistent with our analysis that all four presidents have generally managed a similarly moderate degree of control over the legislative process even if under widely varying circumstances and using different means.
While both legislators and the executive have the capacity to produce bills prominent enough for major media coverage, enacted laws on these topics has been far less frequent for legislators. This was particularly apparent during Pastrana, though successful major legislative bills have been increasingly common since Uribe's era. While this may reflect the elements of a more party-oriented legislature, one must interpret this pattern with caution. First, the sample is quite small. Second, the nature of these bills must be taken into account. For example, widely publicized bills increasing prison terms for drunk drivers, the death penalty for sexual crimes, and regulating church leaders have been successfully enacted, but tend to reflect the ability of politicians to appeal to public support for popular policies rather than attempts to associate parties with broad policy solutions. Thus, even when accounting for notoriety, there are arguably important qualitative differences in the types of major laws successfully pursued by legislators and the president.
One way to illustrate the more controversial nature of executive proposals is to examine the amendment process of bills, which captures the conflict among legislators on the content of the bills. The closest systematic proxy for the amendment process in available data is the number of floor votes per bill, which is only available since 2009. The logic of this measure is that, given the open amendment rule currently used in the legislature, major bills would be subject to significant efforts at modification, while less important bills would go through the legislature with less debate and amendments. Thus, to do this, we divided the sample of bills for which we have votes into those that are legislative, executive, and major executive. Although this illustration is limited, we note that there is a significant difference between legislative and executive bills in terms of effort at amendment. While the major legislative bills during this time have only 3.3 votes on average before passage, this is lower than even ordinary (non-major) executive bills, which have 13 votes on average. We interpret this as suggesting that the type of major bills getting passed from legislators are not especially controversial in terms of the main policy disputes among parties. Meanwhile, the major executive bills during the same time have received an average of 32 votes per bill, which suggest that these bills are drawing a far greater number of amendments than major bills coming from legislators. The main reason for this, we argue, is that the rules of Congress continue to empower individual deputies at the expense of parties. While parties appear to be stronger on the surface compared to Colombia's fragmented "hyper-personalistic" era, the incentives for individual politicians to act as independent players in the legislative process remain firmly intact, despite a major change to the electoral rules. In conjunction with very decentralized legislative rules that allow individual deputies considerable ability to delay, modify and otherwise complicate the passage of bills, presidents must expend substantial resources to control the legislative agenda.
CONCLUSIONS
Without centralized legislative rules, such as those Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) Although we cannot systematically analyze this with available data, the share of "successful" executive bills should be interpreted with some caution as a direct indicator for the executive's influence over the legislative process. 13 Carroll and Shugart (2007) suggest that Uribe's rise outside the traditional party system can be taken as a form of "endogenous evolution," in which party system change responded to failures of democratic institutions. The electoral reform itself, meanwhile, was a consequence of this change but also produced a series of exogenous effects on the party system (Pachon and Shugart 2010).
14 Santos' opponents included a coalition of independent politicians under the label of the Green Party, and candidates from the Conservative, Liberal and Cambio Radical and Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) parties. Santos obtained 46.68% of the vote, followed distantly by Antanas Mockus from the Green Party with just 21.51% of the vote.
15 During the conference committee, text that had been previously deleted was added that included privileges for congressmen and other public employees currently under investigation. Santos' administration only realized this afterward and ultimately had to oppose enactment in that form.
16 Survey data come from the University of Salamanca Proyecto de Élites Parlamentarias en América Latina (PELA) (1998 ( , 2003 ( and 2006 . 17 This method recovers a single dimension reflecting the underlying self-placement scale data while accounting for individual differences in perception of the meaning of ideological placements. This is done by incorporating information on deputies' responses regarding the perceived ideology of the presidential candidates and parties in each period. All periods make use of the common stimuli (parties and candidates) such that their left-right self-placements are comparable across periods. 18 Officially named Partido Social de Unidad Nacional, created in 2005, was a coalition headed by congressmen supporting the reelection bid of Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 19 For clarity, only the six largest parties are shown. One excluded small party called Convergencia Ciudadana, was affiliated with the governing coalition and resembles Cambio Radical in both position and internal variance. 20 The Optimal Classification scaling algorithm estimates of voter locations and divisions between the majority and minority votes that provide the best fit with among a set of dichotomous choice data. The result is a set of positions that can be taken to identify the basic underlying differences in a set of voting patterns among legislators.
194 21 We consider only yeas and nays here, dropping abstentions (when legislators go to the floor but do not vote). Colombia is atypical in its extreme degree of non-voting in the chamber, as about 30% of legislators on average are recorded as present on the plenary floor and still do not vote. Although legislators are not allowed to abstain formally, this has become an informal widespread practice (see Aroca and Guevara 2013) . In this sense, parties are far less "disciplined" than the figures suggest. Our emphasis here, however, is on party-level behavior with regard to interparty similarity and government support when formal votes are cast. 22 An emerging tendency toward rightist opposition to Santos is also reflected in the fact that former president Uribe and close allies subsequently have become publically opposed to the government from the right.
23 Escandón, Marcela. 2013. "Congreso colombiano: balance del 2012 y panorama para el 2013". Razón Pública, April 21st, available at: http://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/politica-y-gobierno-temas-27/3688-congreso-colombiano-balance-del-2012-y-panorama-para-el-2013.html 24 Because of the importance of these local bills, this simplification focuses on the clearest distinction in the sample of legislation, but the "national" category used here is heterogeneous. 25 Since we are focused here on the stages of the legislative process leading up to the floor, this category excludes cases in which the floor voting in each chamber was successful but the final enactment was blocked by a conference committee, presidential veto or by the Constitutional Court. 26 The strategy of the government in this case, was to heavily amend the bill to undermine its effect in case it passed. The bill died after the conference committee version proposed to eliminate certain amendments that changed the bill's original intent (Osorio, 2010a (Osorio, , 2010b . 27 It should be noted that highest executive success rates observed in this period are comparable to the average reported by Cardenas et al (2006) 28 Besides electoral reforms, major bills include a constitutional amendments to prohibit the reelection of the Attorney General, an amendment to change the system by which the Central Bank's Board of Directors is elected, a Minority Rights bill and the Legislator's Ethics Code, among others.
